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Abstract

Cyberattacks on control systems in the chemical process industries cause concern regarding how
they can impact nances, safety, and production levels of companies.

A key practical challenge

for cyberattack detection and handling using process information is that process behavior evolves
over time. Conceivably, changes in process dynamics might cause some detection strategies to ag a
change in the dynamics as an attack due to the new data appearing abnormal compared to data from
before the dynamics changed. In this work, we utilize several case studies to probe the question
of what might be the impacts, benets, and limitations of cyberattack detection and handling
policies when the process dynamics change over time.

The goal of this work is to characterize,

through simulation studies, characteristics which might be desirable and undesirable in cyberattack
detection and handling procedures when process evolution is inevitable. We demonstrate challenges
with cyberattack detection when process dynamics change and subsequently, discuss two concepts
for handling attacks - one which utilizes a two-tier detection strategy in which model re-identication
is triggered when it is not clear whether an attack or a change in the process dynamics has occurred,
and one in which control signals are injected at intervals by the actuators. We utilize simulations
to elucidate characteristics of these strategies and demonstrate that veriability of attack-handling
methods is key to their implementation (i.e., ad hoc tuning has potential to leave vulnerabilities
which an attacker might locate and exploit).

∗

Corresponding author: Tel: +1 (313) 577-3475; E-mail: helen.durand@wayne.edu.

Preprint submitted to Journal of Advanced Manufacturing and Processing

August 27, 2021

1. Introduction

Cyber-physical systems (CPS) combine control components, physical processes, and computer
1

and communication networks to advance control implementation and process operability.

In the

industrial control system context, this may represent a step towards the next generation of manu2

facturing by connecting data collected across the production oor to the Internet.

While important

advances in sensing, control, and wireless technologies can enhance manufacturing operations, cyberattacks take advantage of networked devices and systems and pose a consequent threat to the
3

manufacturing industry.

The outcome of an attack could be disastrous, ranging from loss of prod-

uct/production quality and excessive wear and tear on equipment to risks to the health and safety
4

of human lives, which may have dierent intentions as examined in.

The vulnerabilities identied

in CPS motivate the design of control/detection methodologies that are capable of signaling an
attack when it happens and that respond quickly to the resulting abnormal process behavior in
order to maintain safe operation.
In an attempt to prevent and mitigate cyberattacks, the cybersecurity literature has addressed

several perspectives, which include vulnerability identication and assessment in cyber-physical/manufacturing
5

systems (e.g., ), and detection mechanisms and countermeasures to deal with cyber threats (e.g.,
8

Specically for detecting and handling cyberattacks,

8, 10

).

uses an active defense in which a private ex-

citation superimposed onto the control policy is injected into the system to reveal malicious signal
tampering. A variety of cyberattack scenarios are considered in

10

allowing the denition and notions

of systems-theoretic monitoring limitations relative to attack identication.
11

threats in industrial control systems

and can be characterized according to,

attack cannot be agged based on control inputs and measurement data.

Stealthy attacks are
12

in which a stealthy

There has also been
13

work on exploring cyberattack resilient control from a nonlinear systems perspective
14

equipment design considerations.

and with

In addition to CPS, cyberattack detection methods have been
17

studied in other contexts such as power/smart grids

18

and automotive platforms.

Integrated cyberattack detection and advanced control methods using model predictive control
19

(MPC

) also have been developed as an attempt to identify attacks while guaranteeing closed-loop

2

stability even in the presence of cyberattacks.

21, 20

20

In,

a neural network-based detection method

combined with a model predictive controller for nonlinear systems was designed to potentially
detect sensor tampering. After the detection of cyberattacks, to retain control of the system and
ensure safe operation,

21

proposes a state reconstruction algorithm using machine learning methods

based on the falsied state measurements. Moreover, cyberattack detection and MPC techniques
with economics-based objective functions, named economic model predictive controllers (EMPC

22

),

have been investigated in light of Lyapunov-based constraint properties (Lyapunov-based EMPC
or LEMPC

25

) to maintain closed-loop stability of the system, under sucient conditions, both in

the absence of and in the presence of cyberattacks.

26

Conditions under which cyberattack resilience can be guaranteed are important as part of the
process of verifying safety of systems. Consideration for changing process behavior over time can be
important for guaranteeing safety in uncertain environments. For example, theoretical conditions
have been developed for guaranteeing safe operation in the presence of process dynamics changes for
46

LEMPC.

29

In,

to address model uncertainty and process dynamics anomalies, based on Lyapunov

stability theory, data-driven modeling for an online adaptive learning controller was used with an
30

upper bound on the detection time to ag problematic behavior due to model inaccuracies. In,

an LEMPC framework accounting for faults via online model updates was implemented based on
a moving horizon error detector. A challenge for handling physical changes when cyberattacks on
the sensors can occur is that it may be dicult to distinguish between the cyberattack and changes
in the dynamics of the process when sensor measurements are used for detection of both.
This work utilizes a chemical process example to probe a number of questions highlighted above.
Specically, we discuss stealthy attacks on the process in Section 3.1, and a two-tier detection
concept for cases when attacks are performed on sensors in Section 3.2. In this concept, after initial
detection thresholds are breached, it is unclear if an attack or a change in the process dynamics has
occurred. Subsequently, the detection thresholds are modied, and model re-identication occurs
after data has been collected since the initial detection thresholds were breached. The potential for
this technique to maintain the closed-loop state within a safe operating region for a period of time
after the potential model change or attack is detected is discussed through several case studies using

3

the chemical process under dierent attacks and model changes. Finally, in Section 3.3, actuator
attack compensation using injected actuator signals at pre-specied intervals is investigated.

2. Preliminaries

2.1. Class of Nonlinear Empirical Systems
This work focuses on empirical models that suciently capture the dynamics of a nonlinear
process, and which can be written as a system of nonlinear ordinary dierential equations in the
following form:

x̄˙ b,q (t) = f¯N L,q (x̄b,q (t), ūq (t))
where
and

f¯N L,q

is a locally Lipschitz nonlinear vector function of its argument with

x̄b,q ∈ Rn

ūq ∈ Rm

and

form from a steady-state at
and

Xq

and

xb,q,s ,

xb,q,s

and

uq,s .

The subscript

q

represents the

q -th

q -th

empirical model in Eq. 1, there exists a locally Lipschitz explicit

hN L,q (x̄b,q ) that can render the origin asymptotically stable for all x̄b,q ∈ DN L,q

is a neighborhood of the origin of

f¯N L,q

the stability region of the system of Eq. 1 under
and

Xq .

value of the input,
and

contained in

hN L,q ,

and

Ωρ̂saf e,q

Xq ).

We dene

Ωρ̂q ⊂ DN L,q

as a superset of

Ωρ̂q

f¯i

where

f¯i (0, 0, 0) = 0,

the origin is at

x̄b,q,s

x̄˙ a,i =

and a corresponding steady-state

is a locally Lipschitz nonlinear vector function of its arguments,

wi ∈ Wi ⊂ Rl

as

contained

We also assume that the dynamics of the actual process (represented by

f¯i (x̄a,i (t), ūi (t), wi (t)),

ūi ∈ Rm ,

uq,s

respectively.

DN L,q

DN L,q

Uq

empirical model.

are the allowable sets for the inputs and states when they are in deviation form from

stabilizing controller

in

f¯N L,q (0, 0) = 0,

denote the state and input vectors, respectively, in deviation variable

We consider that for the

(where

(1)

x̄a,i ∈ Rn ,

denote the state, input, and disturbance vectors, respectively, where

Wi := {wi ∈ Rl : |wi | ≤ θ, θ > 0},

for

i = 1, 2, . . .,

and changes in the subscript

i

reect that

the underlying process dynamics can change over time) are also stabilizable in the sense that there
exists a controller that can asymptotically stabilize the origin for all
for the

M

i-th

dynamics used while the

sets of measurements

q -th

x̄a,i ∈ Di ,

where

DN L,q ⊆ Di

empirical model is used. We also assume that there are

yp ∈ Rqp , p = 1, . . . , M ,

available continuously as follows:

yp (t) = kp (x̄a,i (t)) + vp (t)

4

(2)

where

kp

is a vector-valued function, and

measurements

yp .

represents the measurement noise associated with the

We assume that the measurement noise is bounded and for each of the

of measurements when the
controller

vp

q -th

M

sets

empirical model is used, a deterministic observer exists. When a

hN L,q (zp,q ) is used to control the closed-loop system of Eq. 1, we assume that when there is

suciently small plant/model mismatch, disturbances, and noise, the norm of the dierence between
the state estimate (zp,q ,

p = 1, . . . , M )

and the actual state becomes bounded after a certain time

period, and for all initial conditions within a suciently conservative subset of
maintains the closed-loop state within

Ωρ̂saf e,q

for all

t ≥ 0.

Ωρ̂saf e,q , hN L,q (zp,q )

An observer which can satisfy such
31

assumptions under sucient conditions is a high-gain observer.

2.2. Lyapunov-based Economic Model Predictive Control with Empirical Models
25

This work utilizes an LEMPC,

which is an optimization-based control design with an economics-

based objective function, to control the nonlinear process.

Specically, this control formulation

includes two constraints that guarantee that the closed-loop state can be maintained within the
dened operating region

Ωρ̂q

over time when there is no model change, which is benecial from the

perspective of being able to guarantee safe operation in the sense of boundedness of the closed-loop
state. In particular, this control law has the form:

∫

tk+N

min
ūq (t)∈S(∆)
s.t.

[Le (x̄b,q (τ ), ūq (τ ))]dτ

(3a)

tk

x̄˙ b,q = f¯N L,q (x̄b,q (t), ūq (t))

(3b)

x̄b,q (tk ) = x(tk )

(3c)

x̄b,q (t) ∈ Xq , ∀ t ∈ [tk , tk+N )

(3d)

ūq (t) ∈ Uq , ∀ t ∈ [tk , tk+N )

(3e)

V̂q (x̄b,q (t)) ≤ ρ̂e,q , ∀ t ∈ [tk , tk+N )

if

x(tk ) ∈ Ωρ̂e,q

(3f )

∂ V̂q (x(tk )) ¯
∂ V̂q (x(tk )) ¯
(fN L,q (x(tk ), ūq (tk ))) ≤
(fN L,q (x(tk ), hN L,q (x(tk ))))
∂x
∂x
if

x(tk ) ∈
/ Ωρ̂e,q or tk ≥ t′

5

(3g)

where

Le (·, ·)

represents a free-form stage cost that is optimized in Eq. 3 and

represents a suciently smooth Lyapunov function. The notation
is a piecewise-constant input trajectory with period

∆.

ūq (t) ∈ S(∆)

V̂q : Rn → R+
signies that

The prediction horizon is denoted by

x(tk ) in Eq. 3c signies that the predicted state of the empirical model (Eq. 3b) at tk

Eq. 1 is operated under the LEMPC of Eq. 3.
always applied, regardless of the value of

t′

Ωρ̂q

N.

is equal to the

measured state. Eqs. 3e and 3d represent the input and state constraints, respectively.
is selected such that the closed-loop state is maintained within

ūq

Ωρ̂e,q ⊂ Ωρ̂q

over time when the process of

is a time after which the constraint of Eq. 3g is

V̂q (x(tk )).

3. Handling of Stealthy Sensor and Actuator Cyberattacks on Evolving Nonlinear
Process Systems

For processes under MPC, when the dynamics of the process can change over time, the mismatch
between the model used for making state predictions in the MPC and the actual dynamics increases.
Once the mismatch is large enough, the MPC may begin to compute control actions that might
stabilize the dynamics of the system it is simulating, but might not stabilize the actual system
dynamics or could lead to sub-optimal performance. As a result, as the process dynamics change
over time for a process under MPC, there may be a need to update the dynamic model of the
system in the controller over time.

However, when cyberattacks can occur on sensors, attacks

may create characteristics in process data that could be dicult to distinguish from changes in
the process dynamics itself.

Therefore, both detection as well as handling of attacks must be

analyzed for situations in which the process dynamics can evolve. Furthermore, attacks may also
occur on actuators themselves.

One idea for detecting this is to develop an expected mapping

between the control signal that should be computed by an MPC for a given state measurement and
the measured value of the actuator output. These could be compared when sensor measurements
are accurate to detect if there are any discrepancies which might indicate an attack.
38

actuator dynamics can also change over time (e.g., valves can develop stiction

However,

), such that this

method (which essentially again relies on accuracy of the process model unless the signals to the
actuators themselves, rather than process variables like ow rates, are evaluated for closeness with
expected values) could also fail in the presence of changing dynamics. Therefore, in this section,

6

we begin with discussion of the characteristics of attacks on the sensors and actuators which might
bypass any reasonable detection strategy, elucidating through the discussion the complexities arising
in detection when process dynamics can change over time.

Subsequently, we focus on the more

restrictive assumption that only sensor measurement cyberattacks occur, and we utilize a process
example to demonstrate how an example of an attack detection strategy might ag dynamics changes
as attacks, and propose a strategy for preventing such false alarms while still providing a potential
means for maintaining the closed-loop state in a safe operating region for at least some time period
after either a dynamics change or an undetected attack occurs.

Next, we broaden our scope to

examine actuator attacks, which force the process to drive blind, evaluating potential strategies
for maintaining closed-loop stability of a nonlinear process in the presence of sensor and/or actuator
attacks in this circumstance using pre-specied input injection by the actuators. Throughout, we
comment on what the results indicate about general techniques for attack-handling that go beyond
the specic strategies exemplied here.

3.1. Cyberattack Discoverability with Sensor and Actuator Hijacking
Before beginning to probe some of the issues which might occur for attack detection when process
dynamics change, we begin by discussing the concept of stealthy cyberattacks in the context of
the chemical process system we will be evaluating throughout. Stealthy attacks have been discussed
in prior works (e.g.,

39

denes a number of dierent types of stealthy attacks, which are those which

y under the radar of a detection scheme), and a notion of which attacks are able to be detected for
certain systems has been dened theoretically in.

10

In the present manuscript, we call that concept

discoverability of an attack (rather than detectability, which has been considered in the context
42

of control more closely related to observability

), and discuss how a fundamental nonlinear systems

perspective on this concept aids in showcasing why changes in the process dynamics can make it
dicult to detect an attack.
Detection of an attack is generally considered to imply that there is something abnormal in the
process data that indicates that it is not coming from the actual process, but rather from malicious
activity (depending on what is being monitored, however, it may not be possible to tell whether an
attack is occurring). If it is possible for a reasonable detection mechanism (i.e., one which does not

7

ag normal disturbances as attacks) to distinguish any attack on the system, then the system is
cyberattack discoverable. For example, if the system
and has no disturbance or measurement noise (wi

x̄˙ a,i = f¯i (x̄a,i (t), ūi (t), wi (t)) is perfectly known

= 0, vp = 0),

a cyberattack on the sensors of this

system is cyberattack discoverable since any deviation of the measurement away from the state
trajectory of the predicted value can be agged by a cyberattack detection mechanism. However, if
there are disturbances and measurement noise, then though sensor measurement attacks might be
detected if they are inconsistent with the potential set of state trajectories which might reasonably
be developed under dierent realizations of the noise and disturbances, there are some attacks which
would mimic the state trajectory over time as if under a dierent realization of the disturbances and
noise, and therefore should not be discovered by a detection mechanism seeking to ag attacks based
on deviation from apparently allowable behavior. Another way to look at this is that with noise
and/or disturbances, there always exist some cyberattacks that are undiscoverable, but without
noise and disturbances, all cyberattacks are discoverable.
Stealthy cyberattacks aim to develop attack policies for which is not possible to distinguish between actual and false measurement trajectories using detection methods that would not ag normal
process data as attacks. One could consider a stealthy attack to essentially be dynamics-based.
Eectively, it uses the knowledge of the process model, disturbance and noise distributions, and
detection strategy to design an attack that cannot be agged as unexpected. Detecting a cyberattack purely from process data may be challenging because it requires developing expectations
of what the process data should be, which should be derived either from experience or a model. If
data from which predictions are made or conclusions are drawn is falsied, it may be dicult to
determine the appropriate expectation.

Furthermore, when changes in the process dynamics are

possible, it becomes more dicult to design a detection method that can detect the attack. For
example, it would be desirable that the attack detection method not ag model changes as attacks;
this means that the attack detection method would now need to not only avoid agging normal
process data as coming from an attack, but also data that might be consistent with a change in the
process dynamics. Eectively, this broadens the scope of what types of measurement trajectories
should be not agged, leaving attackers with potentially more allowable state measurements

8

that would y under the radar of the detection policy.
Actuator attacks, in contrast, do not falsify state measurements. Therefore, if the measurements
of the actuator outputs were to be measured at any given time and predictions of the state made,
then as long as the process dynamic model is suciently accurate to provide adequate predictions,
no signicant discrepancy will be noted between what states are measured and those which are
predicted under that actuator output. Detection of actuator attacks, therefore, must compare the
signals that the actuator should have generated for a (correct) state measurement with the signal
utilized in adjusting the actuator. One way to try to achieve this might be by developing a relatively
fast method for generating an expected value of the actuator output for a given state measurement
43

using, for example, explicit or multi-parametric MPC

44

or a neural network.

If the actual signal

received by the actuator is evaluated against this expected value (essentially through a redundant
control computation), that may ensure that it receives the correct signal from the controller, but
if there is any computing performed on the signal at the actuator level, then if that code becomes
compromised, there is still a need to evaluate what the actual actuator output was. If the actuator
output is measured from a process variable, however, such as ow rate downstream of a process
valve, that could also be impacted by dynamics of the actuator, which could change over time,
so that once again there would need to be consideration for the point at which the attack will be
agged by a detection strategy via the actuator output versus assumed to be the potential result
of a change in actuator dynamics.

3.1.1. Cyberattack Discoverability with Sensor Hijacking: Process Example Demonstration
The scenario in this section is exemplied using the general model of a continuous stirred tank
reactor (CSTR) in which a second-order reaction
concentration of

A ( CA )

Ṫ =
Rg

occurs.

The states are the reactant

and the temperature (T ), where the dynamics are given by:

ĊA =

Here,

A → B

F
− E
(CA0 − CA ) − k0 e Rg T CA2
V

(4)

F
∆Hk0 − REg T 2
Q
(T0 − T ) −
e
CA +
V
ρ L Cp
ρL Cp V

is the ideal gas constant,

E

is the activation energy,

∆H

is the enthalpy of reaction, and

is the pre-exponential constant. The inlet/outlet volumetric ow rate,

9

(5)

k0

F , is considered xed, as are

the liquid density,

ρL ,

heat capacity,

Cp ,

V.

and liquid volume in the tank,

are as shown in Table 1. The manipulated inputs are the inlet reactant

A concentration (CA0 , which

Parameter

Value

Unit

Parameter

Value

V
Cp
F
E
∆H

1

3
m

300

0.231
5
5 × 104
−1.15 × 104

kJ/kg·K
3
m /h

T0
k0
ρL
Rg

kJ/kmol

The parameter values

Unit

K

8.46 × 10
1000
8.314

6

3
m /h·kmol
3
kg/m
kJ/kmol·K

kJ/kmol

Table 1: Parameters for the CSTR model of Eqs. 4-5

is bounded as follows:

0.5 ≤ CA0 ≤ 7.5 kmol/m3 ) and the rate of heat transferred to the system (Q,

which is bounded as follows:

−5 × 105 ≤ Q ≤ 5 × 105

states and inputs from their steady-state values,

3
kmol/m , and

T̄ = T − Ts ,

Qs = 0

and

kJ/h, respectively, are

uT = [u1 u2 ] = [C̄A0 Q̄],

kJ/h). Vectors of deviation variables for the

CAs = 1.22

3
kmol/m ,

xT = [x1 x2 ] = [C¯A T̄ ],

where

C̄A0 = CA0 − CA0s

and

Ts = 438.2

where

K,

CA0s = 4.0

C¯A = CA − CAs

and

Q̄ = Q − Qs .

The controller used is a model predictive controller that has a quadratic objective function of
the form

xT Qx + uT Ru,

where

Q = diag(104 , 100)

and

R = diag(104 , 10−12 )

(for

u

in MJ/h). Dis-

turbances and measurement noise are considered. Specically, the controller receives measurements
impacted by noise and the process is subject to disturbances. The noise is a random variable characterized by a standard normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviations and bounds

3
of 0.03 kmol/m h and 5 K/h for the concentration of the reactant and reactor temperature, respectively. In addition, process disturbances were added to the right-hand side of the dierential
equations describing the rates of change of

CA

and

T

with zero mean and standard deviations of

3
3
100 kmol/m h and 2200 K/h, and bounds of 50 kmol/m h and 500 K/h, respectively (Case 1).
The false state trajectory provided as a measurement sequence from the sensors to the controller
is developed via a secondary simulation of

CA

and

T

using Eqs. 4-5. In this secondary simulation,

which would be dicult to implement as it assumes the actual value of the state is known at the rst
time that the attack starts, which is not possible given the limitations of measuring devices, disturbances are added to the right-hand side of Eqs. 4-5 taken from the same normal distribution as the
disturbances impacting the process (and bounded with the same bounds), but dierent realizations

10

of the random variable. The noise added to this falsied prediction of

CA

and

T

is similarly taken

from the same bounded normal distribution as the noise impacting the process, but is a dierent
realization.

The attack starts after 30 sampling periods.

Despite the diculty of implementing

this specic attack, the goal of this simulation is to demonstrate the consequences of well-designed
attacks, and this simulation provides a good example of what can readily be understood as a welldesigned attack, since it would not be detectable by a reasonable detection strategy (i.e., given the
inputs, it is a reasonable trajectory for the state because the right-hand side and noise is generated
in the same way as for the process). The subsequent examples demonstrate what the consequences
might be of a well-designed attack, and show that though it may be hard to detect this, consequences could potentially still be that the state is not stabilized around the desired equilibrium.
Specically, the controller continues to receive false state measurements over time (which implies
loss of feedback) and, as a result, the closed-loop state trajectory under the attack may eventually
not track a desired steady-state.
We simulate the control system hypothesized above over 5 h of operation and with the proposed
stealthy attack policy implemented after 0.3 h of operation. The system state was initialized o
steady-state at

xinit = [−0.4

3
T
kmol/m 8 K]
and the simulations were performed in MATLAB

R2016b and fmincon. Fig. 1 shows the attack policy for which the false state trajectory appears to
be subject to noise/disturbances but to have a reasonable behavior. We can see that both process
states

CA

and

T

start to deviate more signicantly from the false states as time progresses. The

trajectories reect that closed-loop stability may be compromised by a stealthy attack.
However, for a dierent stealthy attack, the closed-loop state may not deviate as signicantly
from the steady-state operating trajectory in the same time period. For example, consider the same
process example discussed above but with the process disturbances added to the right-hand side of

3
the dierential equations having bounds of 10 kmol/m h and 100 K/h for the rates of change of

CA

and

T,

respectively (Case 2). We again simulate the control system over 5 h of operation and

with the proposed stealthy attack policy implemented after 0.3 h of operation. The system state
was initialized o steady-state at

xinit = [−0.4

3
T
kmol/m 8 K] and the simulations were conducted

in MATLAB R2016b using fmincon. Fig. 2 depicts the cyberattack policy and both process states

11
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Figure 1: Comparison between the false closed-loop state trajectory (dashed lines) and the system closed-loop
state trajectory (solid lines) with the process under a cyberattack policy implemented after 0.3 h that mimics the
disturbance and measurement noise distributions in Case 1.

CA

and

T

do not deviate considerably from the false states.

Detection mechanisms which rely

on data appearing abnormal may not notice the attacks in this section because the false state
trajectory emulates what the process state trajectory might be with the noise distribution but
dierent realizations of the noise.

3.2. Challenges in Cyberattack-Handling with Changing Process Dynamics
As noted in the prior section, changes in the process dynamics, if they are not to be agged
immediately by an attack detection strategy, may broaden the set of state measurement trajectories
which might not be agged by the detection policy (i.e., be stealthy), which may give an attacker
greater exibility to attempt to cause harm for a process. However, changes in the process dynamics,
even in the absence of an attack, may pose challenges in terms of maintaining the closed-loop state
45, 46

in a desired operating region. Prior work from our group

suggested a technique for handling

changes in the process dynamics in the absence of attacks via control design. The specic control
design utilized in that context was an LEMPC that is able to maintain the process closed-loop
state within a pre-dened region of state-space, as long as the disturbances/plant-model mismatch
are suciently small. However, as the process dynamics change, the plant-model mismatch grows,
which could eventually result in the closed-loop state leaving the expected region of state-space
46, 45

(Ωρ̂q ). In,

we suggested that when the closed-loop state leaves

12

Ωρ̂q ,

this initiates a model re-
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Figure 2: Comparison between the false closed-loop state trajectory (dashed lines) and the system closed-loop
state trajectory (solid lines) with the process under a cyberattack policy implemented after 0.3 h that mimics the
disturbance and measurement noise distributions in Case 2.
identication procedure where, within a dened timeframe after the rst detection of the closed-loop
state leaving

Ωρ̂q

(to prevent the closed-loop state from leaving a safe operating region

Ωρ̂saf e,q

by

allowing it to operate for too long under a controller that can no longer maintain the closed-loop
state in

Ωρ̂q ),

the model must be re-identied with the most recent input/output process data.

Though this method has benets in terms of allowing changes in the process dynamics to be
agged and handled before they might cause safety issues for a nonlinear system, the situation
becomes harder to deal with when cyberattacks on the control system are also considered possible.
26

Specically, in our prior work,

we presented a concept for detecting cyberattacks using redundant

observers based on dierent process state measurements in the absence of changes in the process
dynamics.

In this concept, the redundant observers serve as a validation for one another by en-

suring that there is some degree of consensus among the observers regarding the current state
measurement when there is no attack, and then agging the lack of that consensus as an attack.
45

However, an important issue mentioned in

is that there may be some challenges with handling

cyberattacks in the case that the process dynamics also change over time. Specically, as the process dynamics change, the observers may no longer estimate the state as accurately as before the
process dynamics changed, which may cause an observer-based detection strategy to ag a change
in the process dynamics as an attack. This raises the question of what might be a viable strategy
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for detecting both cyberattacks as well as model changes and then handling each in an appropriate
manner.
One idea for doing this could be to develop a two-tier strategy for detecting attacks or model
changes. Specically, we can develop an original threshold on the dierence between any two state
estimates and an original region

Ωρ̂q .

The characteristics of these detection strategies should be

such that, if there is no attack or model change, the threshold on the norm of the dierence between
the state estimates should not be crossed (this threshold might be determined, for example, from
process data) and the closed-loop state should not leave
leaves

Ωρ̂q

Ωρ̂q .

Then, if the closed-loop state either

or the threshold on the dierence between the state estimates is crossed (or both), a

secondary detection strategy is implemented for attacks with a higher bound as the threshold. This
higher bound should be selected to ensure that as long as the norms of the state estimate dierences
are within the larger bound, the closed-loop state does not leave

∆per

Ωρ̂saf e,q

before a certain time period

has passed even if there was a dynamics change, and that the closed-loop state does not leave

Ωρ̂saf e,q

at any point in time if there was no dynamics change and only an attack. Before

units pass after the rst threshold is breached or the state measurement leaves

∆per

time

Ωρ̂q , the model should

be re-identied with the most recent input/output process data and used to update the LEMPC
formulation to reect a new model and new Lyapunov-based controller, as well as a new

Ωρ̂q+1 .

The

goal of this strategy would be to prevent attacks within the thresholds from being able to create
safety issues, while also facilitating model re-identication when the closed-loop state leaves
that a new

Ωρ̂q+1

Ωρ̂q

so

can be identied in which an updated LEMPC can maintain the closed-loop state

until the next model change. This provides some buer time between each signicant change in the
process dynamics within which the dynamics change can be detected and handled in a way that
allows a buer time for re-identication to again be present after the next signicant change in the
dynamics, while preventing attacks from taking advantage of that strategy to impact safety for the
closed-loop system.
This strategy is proposed for the following reasons: 1) If there is an attack and no model change
that drives the state measurement out of

Ωρ̂q , then as long as the state estimates are required to still

be within a bounded distance (represented by a norm of their dierence) of one another (though
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within a larger bound than was used before the falsied measurements exited

Ωρ̂q ),

it is reasonable

to expect that the attacker is still not able to provide measurements that dier too signicantly
from the actual state (assuming that at least one of the observers is not impacted by the attacks) so
that the larger threshold on the norm of the estimate dierences essentially functions like allowing
greater levels of noise in the system. As long as the control actions computed after the closed-loop
state leaves

Ωρ̂q

prevent the closed-loop state from leaving

Ωρ̂saf e,q

in the presence of the increased

levels of noise, closed-loop stability should not be compromised. 2) If there is a model change and no
attack that drives the closed-loop state out of

Ωρ̂q , then there is greater plant-model mismatch (this

can be considered to be like greater levels of disturbances). As long as the control actions computed
after the closed-loop state leaves
the closed-loop state leaving

Ωρ̂q

Ωρ̂saf e,q

are able to handle these greater levels of disturbances without

∆per , this strategy will prevent the closed-loop state from

before

leaving the safe operating region. 3) If both an attack and a model change occur, then as long as
the control actions computed can handle the compounding eect of both sets of disturbances/noise,
the closed-loop state will not leave

Ωρ̂saf e,q

before

∆per .

Though the logic of the prior section suggests this strategy may have some merit, the description
alone makes it unclear how such a policy might be designed for a system, as well as how parameters
of the strategy impact when it might be successful.
example to analyze some of these considerations under
is outside of

Ωρ̂q

The next section uses a chemical process

∆per

time units after the state measurement

or the rst cyberattack detection threshold is breached.

3.2.1. Challenges in Cyberattack-Handling with Changing Process Dynamics:

Process Example

Demonstration
We utilize a CSTR to explore the concept of the prior section.
continues to follow that in Eqs. 4-5.

The process dynamic model

The objective function, which is the time integral of the

product production rate, is as follows:

∫

∫

tk +N

tk +N

Le =
tk

[−k0 e− RT (τ ) CA (τ )2 ]dτ
E

The parameters of the CSTR follow those in Table 1 except that
and

∆H

have also been updated to

(6)

tk

5 × 103

kJ/kmol and
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k0

1.15 × 104

3
is 13.93 m /h·kmol, and

E

kJ/kmol, respectively. The

steady-state is at

CAs = 2.00

3
kmol/m ,

Ts = 350.20

K. In addition, bounded process disturbances

and sensor noise were added; disturbances were added to the right-hand side of Eqs. 4-5 with zero

3
3
mean and standard deviations of 0.5 kmol/m h and 2 K/h, and bounds of 2 kmol/m h and 5 K/h.
Sensor noise was added to the measurements of

CA

and

T

with standard normal distribution with

3
3
mean zero, standard deviations of 0.01 kmol/m and 0.5 K, and bounds of 0.02 kmol/m and 0.5
K.
The process is controlled by an LEMPC, so that it is necessary to design the Lyapunov-based
controller and stability region. Only the value of

CA0

based controller for the deviation variable form of

is computed by the controller. The Lyapunov-

CA0

is:

hN L,q = −1.6(CA − CAs ) − 0.01(T − Ts )

(7)

3
3
which has input bounds (in deviation variable form) of -3.5 kmol/m and 3.5 kmol/m and a
3
steady-state value of 4 kmol/m .
with
and

The Lyapunov function utilized was quadratic (V̂q

= xT P x ,

P = [110.11 0; 0 0.12]). ρ̂e,q , ρ̂q , and ρ̂saf e,q were obtained by discretizing the state-space
˙
locating a region where V̂q is negative. The initial values selected for these parameters were,

respectively,

247.5, 330,

and

440.

The Lyapunov-based stability constraints are enforced such that

that of Eq. 3f is enforced at the end of each sampling period, and Eq. 3g is enforced only at tk , but if
that constraint is enforced, constraints of the form of Eqs. 3f are enforced at the end of subsequent
sampling periods until the end of the prediction horizon. The problem is solved using fmincon in
MATLAB R2016b. State estimates for this process were obtained using a high-gain observer for
47

the system in transformed coordinates:

ẑ˙ = Aẑ + L(y − C ẑ)
where

A = [0 1; 0 0], C = [1 0],

in the new coordinates, with

y

and

L = [100 10000]T ,
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ẑ

denotes the state estimate vector

as the process output. To obtain the state estimate,

by applying an inverse transformation
from

and

(8)

T −1 (ẑ)

z

is obtained

(this observer design and process model are taken

). This estimator uses an output of temperature to estimate the full state, and is used as

the redundant estimator, with the LEMPC receiving full state feedback (the full state feedback is
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considered to be the secondary observer in the sense that it is the other estimate of the state
besides that taken from the high-gain observer for the purpose of the attack detection strategy).
The strategy for detecting both sensor measurement cyberattacks as well as changes in the process
dynamics is as follows: if the state measurement is outside of

Ωρ̂q

or the norm of the dierence

between the state estimate from the high-gain observer and the state measurement is greater than a
threshold

ϵmax,1 , the upper bound on the norm of the dierence between the state estimate from the

high-gain observer and the state measurement is switched to a new bound

ϵmax,2

and the Lyapunov-

based controller is utilized in place of the LEMPC. From the description of this system and the
proposed method of the prior section, important parameters in facilitating the use of this method
are ϵmax,1 ,

ϵmax,2 , ∆per , Ωρ̂q , Ωρ̂e,q , and Ωρ̂saf e,q .

In this section, we explore how changing these various

parameters can impact the success of the proposed method for some simulated attacks and model
changes to elucidate properties of this strategy.
We begin this investigation by simulating the process over 2 h of operation without any change
in the process dynamics or any cyberattacks. In this simulation

ϵmax,1

is set to 1.02, which in this

simulation did not cause any attack to be agged in the presence of operation under disturbances
and measurement noise as desired, and
from

xinit,1 = [−0.7

ϵmax,2

was (arbitrarily) set to 2.54. The state is initialized

3
T
kmol/m , −30 K] . The results of this simulation are shown in Fig. 3, where

the state estimate and the state measurement are shown to be close to one another throughout the
time of operation, and the closed-loop state is maintained in

Ωρ̂q .

As noted in the prior section, when the process dynamics are able to change, this may complicate
the design of the detection strategy. Specically, it would be desirable that there is some amount
of change in the dynamics which is allowable before a cyberattack detection strategy might ag
the change in the dynamics as an attack.

In addition, the detection thresholds must be large

enough to account for the dierence between the process state measurement and state estimate.
However, if the detection threshold is too large, a cyberattack policy may not be agged within
a reasonable time of operation, and prot loss could occur. Similarly, it would be desirable that

Ωρ̂e,q

be suciently conservative to allow for some amount of potential growth in the plant/model

mismatch over time before the closed-loop state might leave
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Ωρ̂q .

To design the threshold on the
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Figure 3: Baseline case: closed-loop state trajectory without any change in the process dynamics or cyberattacks.
Plots show measured and estimated values at the end of each sampling period.
attacks which might achieve this, as well as

Ωρ̂e,q ,

closed-loop simulations might be run under a

variety of potential next models from dierent initial conditions within
given values of

ϵmax,1

and

ρ̂e,q ,

Ωρ̂q

to ensure that for

no attack or change in the dynamics is agged. To see how such

simulations might be carried out, consider that we would like to be able to avoid agging a model
change in which

k0

3
3
changes from 13.93 m /h·kmol to 18 m /h·kmol as an attack or a change in the

dynamics. We operate the process under the LEMPC described above, with

ϵmax,1

set to 1.02 again.

Figs. 4-5 show the result of this simulation, where the change in the underlying dynamics occurs
after 0.3 h of operation. In this case, the detection method did not ag the change in the process
dynamics as a cyberattack, and Fig. 5 shows that the value of
that the closed-loop state is maintained within

Ωρ̂q

ρ̂e,q

is suciently conservative such

for all times, even after the model change, due to

the switch between the two constraints of Eqs. 3f-3g (i.e., the plant/model mismatch is suciently
small).
Though it was considered desirable to not ag the change in

3
m /h·kmol, we might consider that if the value of

k0

k0

3
from 13.93 m /h·kmol to 18

3
becomes large enough (e.g., 25 m /h·kmol), we

would like to ag the change in the dynamics (to avoid designing

Ωρ̂e,q

to need to be conservative

enough that with such a change in the dynamics, the closed-loop state still needs to remain within

Ωρ̂q ).

Therefore, we would like the change in

strategy or via the closed-loop state leaving

k0

Ωρ̂q .
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to be agged by either the attack detection

Figs. 6-7 show the closed-loop state trajectory
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Figure 4: Closed-loop state trajectory under a change in the process dynamics in which k0 changes from 13.93
m3 /h·kmol to 18 m3 /h·kmol after 0.3 h of operation.
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Figure 5: Stability region and closed-loop state under a change in the process dynamics in which k0 changes from
13.93 m3 /h·kmol to 18 m3 /h·kmol after 0.3 h of operation.
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under this larger change in the process dynamics where

k0

3
changes to 25 m /h·kmol after 0.3 h of

operation. At 0.33 h of operation, the detection method agged the change in the process dynamics
rst (demonstrating the concept stated in this work that it may be dicult to tell the dierence
between a change in the dynamics and an attack from sensor measurements alone), initiating the

hN L,q

use of the backup controller
detection algorithm to

ϵmax,2 .

as well as the change of the upper bound used by the attack

No subsequent attack was detected with the threshold of

2.35. The process state remains within

Ωρ̂saf e,q

ϵmax,2

set to

for the remainder of the 2 h of operation after the

detection of the model change. However, if instead

k0

3
changes to a larger value of 30 m /h·kmol

after 0.3 h of operation, then even after 2 hrs of operation, neither strategy detects the change.
This indicates that it may be desirable to make

ρ̂e,q

larger to attempt to try to cause the larger

change in the dynamics to drive the closed-loop state out of
the boundary of

Ωρ̂q

by getting it potentially closer to

before any mitigating strategy (Eq. 3g) is activated. Here, however, when

is increased to 325 (close to
increased to

Ωρ̂q

ρ = 330),

the change in the dynamics is still not detected, but if it is

ρ̂e,q = 326, the closed-loop state leaves Ωρ̂q

disturbances and proximity of

ρ̂e,q

to

ρ̂e,q

ρ̂q .

before the change in the dynamics due to the

This indicates that it may not be straightforward to tune

this method to achieve specic detection goals with a given model. Furthermore, as the value of

ρ̂e,q

is changed, this can change which inputs are computed by the LEMPC, which may or may not

cause changes in the process dynamics to be agged more readily by the attack detection strategy
by causing the closed-loop state to be driven to dierent conditions than when
value. Finally, we note that if

k0

ρ̂e,q

takes another

3
changes to 35 m /h·kmol after 0.3 h of operation, then

ϵmax,1

is

breached by 0.33 h of operation, but the second threshold is not breached during the remainder of
a simulation of 0.5 h total, providing time for the model to be re-identied without an attack being
detected with this second detection threshold.
Above, the focus was on tuning the parameters of the control law to handle potential changes
in the process model. Now, we turn our focus to the case that there are attacks instead of model
changes. We rst look at the case that there are bias attacks and dierent thresholds

ϵmax,2 .

The closed-loop state is initialized from

xinit,1 = [−1.25, 20]T ,

this case, an attack is agged before it occurs (i.e.,
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ϵmax,1

with

ϵmax,1

ϵmax,1 = 1.02,

and

but in

is not large enough to account for the
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Figure 6: Closed-loop state trajectory under a change in the process dynamics in which k0 changes from 13.93
m3 /h·kmol to 25 m3 /h·kmol after 0.3 h of operation.
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Figure 7: Stability region and closed-loop state under a change in the process dynamics in which k0 changes from
13.93 m3 /h·kmol to 25 m3 /h·kmol after 0.3 h of operation.
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dierence between the state estimate and state measurement which might be observed under normal
operation when the closed-loop state is initialized at
prior simulations). Therefore,

ϵmax,1

xinit,2 ,

though it had been large enough in the

was increased to 1.24, which is a value where no attack is then

agged before the attack occurs in the revised simulation.
strategy for attack-handling, the value of

ϵmax,2

Furthermore, to nish setting up the

must be xed. The value of

ϵmax,2

should be such

that this bound is not breached when a model change alone occurs within the expected bounds.
One way of attempting to determine it could be by simulating the closed-loop system from various
initial conditions on the boundary of

Ωρ̂q

under dierent potential model changes, and recording the

worst-case upper bound on the dierence between the state measurement and the state estimate
over the subsequent time period.

ϵmax,2

should be greater than

ϵmax,1

to avoid agging acceptable

process dynamic behavior as attacks. In this next set of simulations, ϵmax,2 is set to 1.25 to be greater
than

ϵmax,1 ,

but a more rigorous simulation-based analysis of this parameter could be carried out.

We now look at what happens with these thresholds and several bias attacks on the process
sensors. Specically, after 0.3 h of operation, a false state measurement begins to be provided to

3
the LEMPC equal to the actual state plus 0.1, 0.3, or 0.6 kmol/m . The results are shown in Figs. 810 for an operation time of 2 h. Fig. 8 demonstrates that under all three attacks, the control laws
applied were able to prevent the closed-loop state from leaving
second threshold

ϵmax,2

Ωρ̂saf e,q ,

and hence the fact that the

was not breached (which would have caused the discrepancy to be agged

as attacks instead of potentially as model changes) is not problematic from a safety perspective.
Furthermore, with the smallest two bias attacks, the attacks are not detected, indicating that an
attack that is stealthy can be considered the one in which the attack policy is within the bounds of
the detection threshold. For the largest bias attack, the attack was rst detected by the measurement
leaving

Ωρ̂q ,

rather than by the detection threshold, indicating once again that it may be dicult

to distinguish between a dynamics change and a sensor measurement cyberattack. Furthermore,
Fig. 9 and 10 indicate that a good degree of visually problematic bias in the measurement can
remain un-detected (i.e., be stealthy with respect to either the rst (Fig. 9) or second (Fig. 10)
bound). Despite that this is undesirable, if

ϵmax,1

is decreased, there are initial conditions in the

stability region from which normal operation might be agged as an attack, as stated above. This
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Figure 8: State-space trajectories under the three dierent bias attacks in the sensor measurements occurring after
0.3 h of operation.
indicates that part of the reason for the stealthy attacks getting through in this case is that the
disturbances aecting the process and expected model changes are large enough to allow a number
of attacks, even those which visually create a large bias in the state measurement compared to the
estimate, to not be detected that way. This suggests that an additional attack detection policy on
top of this state estimation-based method (perhaps one which is based on recognizing patterns in the
estimate and measurement data) may provide additional leverage to attempt to detect and diagnose
attacks. Another interesting point noted from the above simulations is that in the cases simulated,
the value of

∆per

did not need to be evaluated (i.e., all of the attacks and model changes discussed

above maintained the closed-loop state within

Ωρ̂saf e,q

for all times). Though this is not necessarily

a rule, it indicates the complexity of the design process for the parameters of the suggested attack
detection method, and the extent to which the process dynamics under the control laws selected as
part of the attack-handling policy dictate their relevance to the safety problem under attacks and
model changes. A similar statement would hold for the sizes of

Ωρ̂saf e,q

and

Ωρ̂q .

From the above discussion, it can be expected that tuning the proposed method to eliminate
vulnerabilities which an attacker might exploit (e.g., initial conditions from which certain state
measurements which y under the radar could cause a problematic eect) while seeking to achieve
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Figure 9: Trajectories of the state estimate and state feedback under the bias attack of 0.1 in the sensor measurement
occurring after 0.3 h of operation.
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Figure 10: Trajectories of the state estimate and state feedback under the bias attack of 0.6 in the sensor measurement
occurring after 0.3 h of operation.
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desired goals in model change handling might be challenging with the type of trial-and-error tuning
procedure pursued above, particularly due to the relationships between the control law parameters.
This suggests that a theoretical analysis of the proposed method, which is outside the scope of the
present manuscript, may aid in elucidating the relationships between the parameters and how to
obtain a sucient strategy, though this may be theoretical to the point that it could be dicult
to utilize in developing the strategy in a non-simulation-based manner without additional research.
Specically, with cybersecurity studies, the viability of a concept lies not in its ability to work for
some cases, but in its ability to guarantee that there are no cases in which it does not work (i.e., no
vulnerabilities exist). A simulation-based approach may achieve this goal by performing exhaustive
case studies that ensure that all vulnerabilities/scenarios have been analyzed.
26

Another observation regarding the proposed strategy is that the detection strategy from

which

does not account for model changes simultaneously requires that not all estimators can be impacted
by false sensor measurements (i.e., at least one must not be attacked). Such a requirement would
still need to be imposed to consider the two-tier detection strategy for the case when model changes
may also occur because if all estimators are attacked, there is no longer a check for any of the
measurements. The impact of this is that the detection strategy cannot handle certain attacks. For
example, a stealthy attack that fully mimics alternative process dynamics would not be guarded
against if it was performed in the manner shown in Figs. 1-2.
The results so far have explored cases where either a model change occurs or a cyberattack occurs
and demonstrated that the two-tier detection strategy with the parameters utilized in the various
simulations above is able to prevent the closed-loop state from leaving

Ωρ̂saf e,q

too quickly. Here,

we explore what happens when both a model change and a cyberattack occur at once. The model
change to be investigated is a gradual decrease in
In this case, the value of

k0

k0 to represent, for example, catalyst deactivation.

is decreased, starting at 0.5 h of operation, every 0.5 h, taking values

3
of 13, 11, 9, 7, 5, and 3 m /h·kmol over time. An attack is performed on the measurement of
(the measurement of
above paragraph).

T

CA

should not be attacked to demonstrate this method in accordance with the

The value of

CA

is calculated using Eqs. 4-5 and adding a realization of the

disturbance to the right-hand side of each of those equations that is dierent from that applied to
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the actual process, but from the same distribution. Noise is then added to the resulting value of

CA

from the same distribution as the sensor noise, but again a dierent realization (i.e., the value of

CA

is determined as if it was coming from a stealthy attack of the type in Figs. 1-2, but the measured
value of

T

is not). In addition, the simulation of Eqs. 4-5 used to obtain the falsied value of

modied over time to have the value of

k0

CA

is

change. Specically, the attack starts at 1.3 h and then

for the rst 0.5 h after the attack is started, the value of

k0

3
is set to 11 m /h·kmol, for the next 0.5

3
3
h it is set to 10 m /h·kmol, for the next 0.5 h it is set to 9 m /h·kmol, for the next 0.5 h it is set to 8
3
3
m /h·kmol, and subsequently it is set to 7 m /h·kmol. The process is simulated for 4 h of operation,
and the trajectory for the closed-loop state in Fig. 11 results, along with the trajectories in Fig. 12
of the measured values of

CA

and

T

in deviation from their steady-state values (where the measured

values are subjected to noise and the attack) and the estimated values of

CA

and

T

in deviation

from their steady-state values. No attack is detected in the time of operation, but the closed-loop
state exits

Ωρ̂saf e,q

during the time of operation. If, however, only the model change is simulated for

the 4 h, or only a stealthy-type attack for the system with no model change, neither is detected and
the closed-loop state does not leave

Ωρ̂saf e,q .

This suggests that in Figs. 11-12, the situation with the

model change favors the stealthy-type attack that the attacker performs when the model changed
compared to the situation where the model does not change. However, because the attack is based
on the process dynamics, which are dierent in the scenarios with and without the model change,
the attacks are not identical in terms of which false state measurements they provide over time or
which dynamic systems they are applied to when implemented, which contributes to the dierence
here in terms of attack impact. The fact that the model change and attack combination was able
to drive the closed-loop state out of

Ωρ̂saf e,q

suggests that the detection strategy developed via the

other examples earlier in this section is still not sucient for achieving attack-handling when there
are model changes and must be further modied to handle all of these cases, again highlighting that
extensive simulations may be needed to attempt to design this strategy according to the process
and its vulnerabilities.
In closing, we note that the above simulations looked only at the system behavior before the
model re-identication triggered by the breaching of the thresholds.
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However, as demonstrated
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Figure 11: State-space trajectories under the gradual change in the value of k0 occurring after 0.5 h of operation and
the attack occurring after 1.3 h of operation.
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Figure 12: Trajectories of the state estimate and state feedback (state measurements including noise and attacks)
under the gradual change in the value of k0 occurring after 0.5 h and the attack occurring after 1.3 h of operation.
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above, there may be cases where the rst detection threshold is breached, but not the second,
leaving it ambiguous as to whether the dynamics changed, or there was an attack on the sensors.
In this case, the strategy triggers model re-identication if the second detection threshold is not
breached. If the data from before the model re-identication was falsied, the attacker is essentially
forcing an MPC to re-program itself using data that is not correct. However, if that data is not
too far from correct due to the agging when the redundant observers give signicantly dierent
estimates, it is possible that the new model would have mismatch, but not necessarily de-stabilize the
45

system. This discussion is closely related to that rst brought up in,

which provided a simulation

in which the mismatch after model re-identication was triggered using some falsied data was not
able to cause the closed-loop state to leave a safe operating region under the conditions simulated.
However, a rigorous investigation of how, whether, and when issues after the re-identication might
occur within the context of the two-tier detection policy is beyond the scope of this work and can
be a subject of future research.

Remark 1. There is no guarantee that, without the proposed two-tier detection strategy, the closed-

loop state would behave worse (i.e., it would exit

Ωρ̂saf e,q

more quickly than desired if there was an

attack or model change).

Remark 2. Though the above discussion is based on the use of

Ωρ̂saf e,q

and the detection strategy

26 which are related to LEMPC, the general concept that a control law might be complemented
from
by redundant estimators to attempt to identify attacks, as well as other thresholds on the state which
could reect changes in the dynamics, is not restricted to the use of LEMPC. However, we expect
it to be possible to develop rigorous theoretical guarantees regarding the conditions under which the
proposed method using LEMPC is able to prevent the closed-loop state from leaving

Ωρ̂saf e,q

for a

certain time period after an attack or model change begins. A technique with rigorous theoretical
guarantees may hold benets for cyberattack and model change handling if developments can be made
which enable the theoretical guarantees to be validated as having been achieved by a given control
law design for a specic process. Theoretical guarantees relevant to this strategy have been presented
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in.
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Remark 3. Both stealthy attacks and faulty sensors provide distorted state measurements to the

controller. The two-tier strategy is not able to distinguish faulty sensors from sensor attacks when
it ags an attack.

However, attacks and sensor faults may behave dierently in practice.

For

example, sensor failures may not provide updated data or may provide only a constant or biased
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state measurement.

In contrast, attacks may be facilitated by an intelligent adversary that can

modify the sensor measurements through attack policies. A stealthy attack therefore has the potential
to be a process-aware policy that could y under the radar of any reasonable detection method. On
the other hand, a faulty sensor corresponds to a measurement defect that is not inherently dynamicsbased/process-aware. One idea for attempting to prevent sensor faults being agged as attacks is to
try to prevent sensor readings that occur during routine plant operation, even with some degradation,
from falling outside of the detection bounds of the cyberattack detection and model handling policy.
Then, with frequent sensor maintenance, it could become less likely that the sensor fault would be
agged as an attack using the cyberattack and model change handling strategy. That again impacts
the tuning of the strategy. Another potential idea for checking if the process has a sensor failure,
rather than an attack, is to replace the sensors (or switch to redundant sensors or state estimators
that are accurate enough) once they are detected to be potentially under attack to attempt to remove
either of the issues, though this may pose the challenge of needing to have backup hardware that can
be switched to immediately at any time that a possible attack or model change is agged.
Remark 4. The trade-os in what can be achieved as parameters of the strategy are adjusted, as

described above, are experienced partially because the attack detection/control strategy is not exible
enough to allow all goals one might desire to achieve to be met. For example, while it may be possible
to ag an attack with a certain magnitude, that might at the same time cause model changes that
would not be desired to be agged to be noted. The example is not meant to demonstrate that it is
not possible to nd a satisfactory design, but rather that it may not be possible to achieve arbitrary
objectives simultaneously with this strategy, or may take a variety of simulations to nd values of
tuning parameters which are satisfactory for a given set of objectives, unless these can be determined
via theory. Because a cyberattack handling strategy has to remove all vulnerabilities to be valuable,
it has to be able to handle in some fashion (either by preventing safety issues if an attack is not
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detected, at least for some time, or agging the attack) both stealthy as well as non-stealthy attacks.

Remark 5. Though the discussion of cyberattack discoverability in Section 3.1 was presented in

relationship to a reasonable detection mechanism that would not ag an attack, in practice, the
discoverability of an attack will depend on the detection mechanism, as shown above (e.g., Fig.8).
The ability to design a stealthy attack then in practice is not necessarily limited to whether it
reproduces the process dynamics, but is detection mechanism-dependent.

Any attack that is not

detected by the detection mechanism in use would be stealthy for that case.
3.3. Challenges in Actuator Cyberattack-Handling using Smart Actuator Signals
While the prior sections discussed the challenges when false sensor measurement cyberattacks
and evolving process dynamics may occur individually or simultaneously, this section examines
the case where actuator cyberattacks are considered and investigates concepts for handling these
cyberattacks temporarily using pre-specied stabilizing signals, which could also be used to tackle
attacks on controller code.

We use the same CSTR process model described in Section 3.1 to

demonstrate the impacts of cyberattacks on actuators, which has a dierent nature compared to
the false sensor measurement cyberattack. Specically, the input actions are applied to the plant
by the actuator attack, regardless of the control actions computed by the controller (it is essentially
an open-loop system under actuator hijacking), as an attempt to either drive the system state out
of a safe operating region or force the system to lose signicant prot over time. In this example,
the actuator attack policy applies random input values (which follow a normal distribution) around
the steady-state input value to the CSTR. If the process is operated at a stable steady-state, the
system state may or may not continue to be maintained around the operating steady-state under
the attack depending on how large the bounds on the actuator outputs are and how small the
sampling period is.
To show this, consider the CSTR process model represented by Eqs. 4-5. The steady-state with

CAs = 1.22
point.

3
kmol/m ,

Ts = 438.2

K,

CA0s = 4

3
kmol/m , and

The process parameters are listed in Table 1.

Qs = 0

kJ/h is a stable equilibrium

The noise is represented by a standard

3
normal distribution with mean zero, standard deviations of 0.03 kmol/m and 5 K, and bounds of
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Figure 13: System state trajectory with the process under an actuator cyberattack policy with smaller input bounds.
3
0.03 kmol/m and 5 K for the concentration of the reactant and reactor temperature, respectively.
In addition, process disturbances were added to the right-hand side of the dierential equations
describing the rates of change of

CA

and

T

3
with zero mean and standard deviations of 100 kmol/m

3
h and 2200 K/h, and bounds of 10 kmol/m h and 10 K/h, respectively.
To perform the simulation of the system described above under the actuator attacks, the random
actuator input attack policy is implemented on both corresponding inputs,
sampling period of 0.01 h and with zero mean and standard deviation
respectively, and

|u1 | < 0.1 kmol/m3

and

|u2 | < 104

5

u1

and

u2 ,

3
kmol/m and

with a

105

kJ/h,

kJ/h. We simulate the process under the attack

policy over 10 h of operation with the process state initialized o steady-state from

3
T
kmol/m 8 K] in MATLAB R2017b using fmincon. The integration step used was

xinit = [−0.4

10−4

h. Fig. 13

depicts the simulation results which show that the system state trajectory with the process under
the actuator cyberattack policy was maintained close to the origin (stable equilibrium point). This is
due to a combination of factors, including that the input bounds were small enough to keep the state
around the operating steady-state (fundamentally, random inputs are applied to a nonlinear system
and they achieve the behavior demonstrated). However, if for the same simulation description, the
actuator attack policy uses a larger input bound,

|u1 | < 0.2

3
kmol/m , the system state leaves a

region around the operating steady-state. This is shown in Fig. 14.
The simulations above raise the question of how large the actuator input bounds must be and
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Figure 14: System state trajectory with the process under an actuator cyberattack policy with larger input bounds.
how often new values of the input must be computed by the random attack policy to cause a
problem for the process. Specically, there exists a complex interaction between the input bounds,
time period over which the input is held constant, and the nonlinear process dynamics. For example,
even when the actuator input attack bounds are large, if the sampling period is suciently small,
the process operated at a stable steady-state may be kept at this operating steady-state. To see
this, consider the latter case described above where

|u1 | < 0.2

3
kmol/m , but we use

∆ = 0.005

h

and the same time length for the prediction horizon. Fig. 15 outlines this scenario, in which the
sampling period was small enough to have the rogue inputs applied more frequently, but around
the steady-state input value, which maintained the system state around the stable steady-state.
The above simulations suggest that if the mean value of the stable steady-state input is applied
often enough, attacks which seek to apply rogue inputs when the stable steady-state input is not
being applied may have diculty to destabilize the system. Inspired by this, we consider a potential
strategy for attempting to deal with attacks where actuators (as well as potentially other aspects of
the control loop like sensors and/or controller codes) could be compromised. In this strategy, which
we will henceforth term a smart actuator device, the smart actuator applies the mean value of the
inputs (i.e., steady-state inputs) at certain times of the process operation as an attempt to maintain
the system state around the operating steady-state. The advantage of such a system approach is
that it does not rely on state measurements to stabilize the process as required for any stabilizing
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Figure 15: System state trajectory with the process under an actuator cyberattack policy with smaller sampling
period.
feedback controller. The eects of any cyberattack on the controller code or state measurements
would not impact the smart actuator signals to the plant. To demonstrate this strategy, consider
again the second case description where

|u1 | < 0.2

3
kmol/m and

∆ = 0.01

h. The smart actuator

is designed to implement the steady-state input signals after every 50 sampling periods and hold
these input values for another 50 sampling periods (i.e., the steady-state input is held for the rst
50 sampling periods, then the attack occurs for the next 50, then the steady-state input is held for
the next 50 sampling periods, the steady-state input is held for the next 50 sampling periods, and
so forth until 450 sampling periods have passed, after which point the smart actuator is no longer
employed for the remainder of the 10 h of operation). The result is shown in Fig. 16 and, in this
case, the smart actuator was able to maintain the system state around the operating steady-state
by injecting stabilizing signals regularly to the process. The use of the proposed strategy, however,
may cause undesirable prot loss that must be considered during normal operation compared to
a case where a controller is used to compute the control inputs at all times (i.e., the steady-state
input is not applied for long time periods when the controller is not used).
Although the considerations above have been made for processes operated at a stable steadystate, many chemical processes are operated around unstable steady-states. It is therefore important
to ask how and/or whether the smart actuator strategy might be applied to processes that operate
around an unstable steady-state. However, though it is possible to stabilize an unstable steady-state

33

0.5

0

-0.5
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

20

0

-20

-40

Figure 16: System closed-loop state trajectory with the process under the smart actuator with the random actuator
attack.
with a control law, we are attempting to stabilize this steady-state without needing to know the
state measurement (as it could be compromised), which makes the problem challenging given the
dynamics of unstable steady-states. For such a strategy to work, there would need to be some control
policy which could be specied a priori and which would be known to be capable of maintaining
the closed-loop state in a dened region of operation if repeatedly executed in open-loop. Though
one could try to map dierent initial states in the region of operation to control signals which can
cause the Lyapunov function to be negative for all initial conditions in that region of state-space
and then to apply these inputs in sequence to see if this is able to stabilize the system overall, there
is no guarantee that a sequence that can achieve this is available, or that these actuator inputs
would stabilize the operating steady-state in the presence of cyberattacks. The reasons for this are
that 1) actuator cyberattacks may provide rogue signals which could drive the closed-loop state
away from the operating steady-state when the sequence is not applied; and 2) the location of the
actual state over time in general might be crucial for applying the correct control signal.

Remark 6. Due to the prot loss concerns for the smart actuator concept, it might be considered

as a backup strategy to employ if a detection algorithm indicates that the actuators have been compromised. For example, one could measure the actuator outputs and compare them with what should
have been computed for a given sensor measurement. If the expected signals dier signicantly from
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each other, the smart actuator could be activated, which may give enough time to keep the process
safe until the problem is solved.

Remark 7. Evolving dynamics in actuators have similar eects compared to an actuator attack

in the sense that actuator outputs are no longer computed with full accuracy. One might consider
checking the actuator output and the expected value of the actuator output after some fraction of a
sampling period after the control signal was received by the actuator to account for potential delays
until the actuator output is fully equal to its nal value due to the dynamics of the actuator itself.

4. Conclusion

This work explored several concepts for countering cyberattacks on nonlinear systems with
evolving dynamics. The concepts explored included one in which redundant state estimators are
used as part of a two-tier detection strategy, where either a bound on the dierence between the
measurement and estimate of the state or a measurement of the state outside of an operating region
in state-space would trigger model re-identication after a certain time period and would cause the
threshold on the state estimate and measurement dierence to be increased. A second cyberattack
handling approach explored was meant to counter attacks directly on actuators via compensating
signals which the actuators could apply.

However, extensive case studies may be needed to be

performed if a simulation-based approach solely is used to tune the design parameters and identify
all possible vulnerabilities. An observation suggested by the results with the actuator compensation
is that the dierent sequence of the inputs and what they were impacted whether certain attacks
were successful. This suggests that detection and attack-handling policies tuned in an ad hoc fashion
based on simulation, rather than theory, may be sensitive to suboptimality or to initial guesses for
nonlinear optimization problems if the algorithms only provide local minima.
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